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As the saying goes, in every crisis lies an opportunity. 
As the world yet again experiences economic 
downturn, we are once more hearing calls to use 
this moment to restructure our economies to address 
the fundamental challenge of climate change. 
Just over ten years ago, the UN Environment 
Programme proposed a Global Green New 
Deal; to use the economic recovery as a driver for 
change towards greater sustainability and lower 
emissions. It is safe to say that the world missed its 
chance. The half-hearted, ‘quick profit’ policies put 
in place then had little consequence for emissions, 
and got nowhere near to delivering the innovative 
transformation of the economy we need. We 
couldn’t even sustain economic growth, which should 
not surprise when sustainability is no priority. Instead 
of initiating the transition towards a sustainable, 
more just, but also climate resilient economy, climate 
action has remained incremental and evolutionary, 
rather than decisive and revolutionary.
We simply cannot allow this opportunity to pass us by 
again. If we do, I fear our world will never recover.
As climate change forces us to fundamentally 
transform our entire economy, we need to 
understand the implications, interlinkages and 
opportunities that this transformation brings 
across that same economy. How public and 
private investments in climate infrastructures and 
technologies actually affect consumers, jobs, and 
business for existing and new industries. And thereby, 
how such action can deliver both near time positive 
impacts for the economy and long-term emissions 
reductions that enable a prospering netzero 
economy by 2050 in a fair and sustainable way. 
In times of populism, extremism, political instability and 
ideologically driven movements, we need to firmly re-
establish science, truth and transparency at the heart 
of policy making. That is why Bellona is so pleased 
to be working with the University of Strathclyde and 
some of its world-leading economists. 
The Bellona Foundation is an 
independent non-profit organisation 
that aims to meet and fight the 
climate challenges, by identifying 
and implementing sustainable 
environmental solutions. Bellona 
works towards reaching a greater 
ecological understanding, and the 
protection of nature, the environment 
and health. Bellona is engaged in a 
broad range of current national and 
international environmental questions 
and issues around the world. It has 
offices in Oslo, Brussels, Murmansk 
and St Petersburg, alongside experts in 
the U.S. and the UK.
The Centre for Energy Policy (CEP) was established in November 
2014 as a centre of expertise on the macroeconomic modelling 
of energy and climate policy.
Led by Professor Karen Turner, the Centre works with a wide range 
of partners to bring current research from a wide energy and 
climate base into the public policy debate. 
The global energy landscape is changing fast and this presents 
challenges to society, industry, commerce and governments as they 
seek to develop relevant and appropriate strategies. The role of 
the Centre is to bring evidence based critical thinking to addressing 
these challenges across all economic sectors. 
Jonas Helseth - Director, UK and Europe, Bellona Europa.
This report represents the start of a crucial journey 
we will be embarking on over the next 2 years 
to help identify and understand different courses 
of action to achieving net zero greenhouse gas 
emissions in an equitable and just way. Our work 
with Prof. Karen Turner and her team at the Centre for 
Energy Policy will build on decades of experience 
and expertise acquired at the University and within 
Bellona to form the basis of a groundbreaking 
partnership between civil society and academia. 
This paper shows that investing in enabling activities 
and infrastructures to slash emissions can have 
substantial benefits for people and the planet. And 
that this is not only possible in the future, it is possible 
today. If we can build back better now and recover 
from this catastrophic shock to society, we will not 
just help by saving and creating jobs, but we lay the 
foundations for future climate resilience and help 
to create a new age where carbon neutrality and 
environmental sustainability are right at the core of 
our global economic model.
Whatever we do now to protect and support those 
worst hit by the Covid-19 pandemic crisis needs 
to simultaneously render our economy fairer and 
cleaner. This time, we cannot afford to fail.
School of Government and Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde 
Dr Justus Andreas
Bellona Foundation
W:www.bellona.org 
E: justus@bellona.org 
T: 07485206447
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We show that net zero actions can deliver the type of short term employment, real income and GDP improvements 
that will be crucial for near term economic recovery from the pandemic. Such actions will simultaneously deliver 
essential foundations for a sustainable and prosperous transition where sustained economic and societal gains are 
realised alongside deep emissions reductions.
We demonstrate through rigorous analyses how a combination of public and private sector actions taken now can 
help put the UK back on a trajectory of competitive economic prosperity. In each case, we apply the CEP Net Zero 
Principles Framework to develop a common understanding of how decarbonisation actions can deliver economic 
benefits as well as costs in two distinct stages: 
• Enabling stage – actions and investments in equipment, infrastructure and/or systems capability to enable
subsequent emissions reductions.
• Realising stage – activities, processes and responses that utilise enabling activities and infrastructure to
actually realise emissions reductions through how we live and work.
Using this framework, and drawing on a foundation of applied economy-wide modelling, we analyse the nature, 
timing and potential beneficiaries of any sources of net economic gains emerging. We consider how net gains 
emerging in different timeframes could be used to balance costs accruing to some parts of the economy and to public 
budgets. Importantly, we highlight the potential unintended consequences of different actions and approaches, with 
the aim of identifying solutions that ensure the delivery of sustained economic prosperity and a ‘just transition’.
The Covid-19 pandemic brings into sharp focus the need for net zero actions to sustain and con-
tribute to the well-being of the UK economy and society. Now more than ever, it is crucial that what 
we do to reduce our emissions can deliver both near term and sustained positive impacts across the 
economy to ensure prosperity and justice in our society. 
This special joint paper from the Centre of Energy Policy at the University of Strathclyde (CEP) and the Bellona Foundation 
considers the design of a Framework for recovery that could align our near-term economic priorities with both short and 
medium-term climate goals. In doing so, it focuses on three key actions for achieving net zero: 
Executive Summary
Enabling and realising 
residential energy 
efficiency gains
Facilitating the electric 
vehicle rollout
Investing in Carbon 
Capture and Storage 
(CCS) infrastructure to 
transform process industry. 
1. Improving the energy efficiency of domestic
households provides a suite of near and
longer term positive economic outcomes on
top of a wide range of emissions reduction
and health benefits.
Investing in domestic energy efficiency provides 
potential for near and longer term economic 
expansion through both the enabling activity of 
delivering retrofitting projects for efficiency
improvements in people’s homes and through the real 
income and spending impacts of households realising 
energy efficiency gains and lowering their energy 
bills. Thus, it is an important mechanism in reducing 
fuel poverty and helping those who may have been 
worst affected by the Covid-19 slowdown. Ultimately, 
the UK Government’s ECO programme has, in its 
present form, the potential to deliver a sustained real 
GDP boost of up to 0.07% (£979million) per annum 
supporting just over 19,500 full-time equivalent (FTE) 
jobs across a wide range of sectors, in turn supporting 
household expenditure in the UK economy. With 
around £10.9billion spent between 2013 and 2028, 
this translates to a societal return of 1.8 jobs and 
£2.3million of cumulative GDP gains (by 2040) per 
£million spent. Greater net gains could be realised 
by supporting energy efficiency improvements across 
more UK households, focussing more ECO funds on 
projects through the provision of net zero loans and/
or government grants. However, this requires that 
energy bill, loan repayment and/or tax burdens on 
households do not offset the real income boost that 
powers a consumer spending driven expansion.
2. Investing in infrastructure upgrades to the
electricity network to facilitate the roll out
of electric vehicles could stimulate the wider
economy over time, while delivering cleaner
air and emissions reductions to the transport
sector but with energy price rises constraining
nearer term expansion.
Investing in the EV rollout can deliver near term 
and sustained positive effects on real GDP (with 
gains of up to 0.1%, or £1.4billion per annum) and 
significant job creation. These gains are driven mainly 
by increased activity in UK domestic electricity 
supply chains and by real income gains that allow 
UK households to spend more money across the 
wider economy. Enabling even an initial EV rollout 
projected to 2030, here through £2.7billion 
spending on electricity network upgrades, could 
ultimately support up to 3,000 additional jobs in 
multiple sectors, mapping to around 1.1 FTE job per 
£1million spent. However, given the importance 
of ensuring a ‘just transition’, a key question for 
policymakers will be whether any action can be 
taken to prevent or balance upward pressure on 
electricity prices, particularly in the near term as 
investment costs are recovered. Any increase on 
bills will disproportionately increase costs on lower 
income households, as well as constraining the 
consumer spending driven element of the expansion. 
3. Investing in critical CO2 transport and
storage infrastructure provides a transitory
stimulus to the wider economy and establishes
the foundations for CCS to play a key role
in reducing emissions in key high value
industries over the coming decades, and to
evolve the role of the oil and gas industry.
Ultimately, the long-term GDP boost associated 
with Government investment in 3 or 4 strategic 
CCS infrastructure hubs (costing up to a potential 
£1.75billion) could deliver a short-term wider 
economy gain of around £0.2million of cumulative 
GDP per £million spent. Crucially in the post-pandemic 
economic climate, this investment can lead to the 
almost immediate creation of between 1,700 and 
3,850 new jobs per year over an assumed 6-year 
investment timeframe. This equates to an average of up 
to 1.6 jobs per year per £1million spent. However, the 
crucial outcome of this early investment will ultimately 
be the foundations set for the creation of a new large-
scale CO2 management industry that could help 
sustain and evolve potentially hundreds of thousands 
of jobs in UK manufacturing and fossil fuel industries.
The key general conclusion emerging is that net 
zero actions need to be considered in terms of a 
holistic, economy-wide approach to the recovery 
that prioritises the transition to net zero emissions. 
Such a recovery also needs to establish fair and 
just means for apportioning costs and benefits, and 
not simply view investments towards net zero as 
constraints on economic growth.
The policy challenge arising is that different 
mechanisms for funding net zero activity are shown 
to have key implications for the nature, extent and 
equity of economic growth. The research highlights 
the fact that any up-front investment activity can 
introduce price pressures and crowd out other 
activities. In the net zero context, particular attention 
is required regarding  impacts on energy prices, 
particularly in recovering investment costs. This is 
both in terms of potential near term impacts on 
those least able to pay, and on how the consumer 
spending driven element of the resulting stimulus may 
be affected. Thus, a crucial consideration is setting 
foundations for a just and prosperous transition 
around which societal consensus can build.
The Covid-19 pandemic has caused 
unprecedented worldwide economic 
disruption with nations, communities 
and entire industries brought to a 
standstill. Faced with the prospect of its 
most significant recession ever,i the UK 
government responded with a rescue 
package designed to keep businesses 
and jobs secure whilst the worst impacts 
of the virus hit the economy. 
Now, as attention moves from the initial rescue 
to longer-term recovery and reform, focus is also 
shifting back to the other great economic and 
societal challenge of our time: climate change 
and the transition to a net zero economy.ii  
Within this, key questions must centre around 
whether and how the recovery can be designed 
to simultaneously service the need to reform the 
nature of economic activity in the UK and put us 
on a sustainable, prosperous and just pathway 
to our mid-century net zero goals. 
Drawing on results and analysis from economy-
wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
simulation modelling, this special joint paper from 
the Centre of Energy Policy at the University of 
Strathclyde (CEP) and the Bellona Foundation 
considers the design of a framework for recovery 
that could align our near-term economic priorities 
with both short and medium-term climate goals. 
The latter includes the UK’s broader 2050 target 
for net zero greenhouse gas emissions. The paper 
demonstrates, through rigorous analysis of three 
examples of net zero activities currently under 
consideration for deployment (enabling residential 
energy efficiency, the EV rollout and infrastructure 
development for CO
2
 transport and storage), 
how policy decisions taken now can put the UK 
back on a trajectory of competitive GDP, income 
and employment growth. In doing so, it presents a  
model to inform economic decision making, which 
could be taken forward, for example as part of 
Her Majesty’s Treasury’s ongoing review on Net 
Zero planning and principles.iii  
Introduction
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5In February 2020, CEP published the first iteration of a Net Zero Principles Framework that set out 
the need to consider the challenge of meeting the UK’s ambitions of a carbon neutral economy by 
2050 in terms of the policy, political economy and societal consequences of any decarbonisation 
action. Crucially, the Frameworkiv was grounded in the premise that the wider economy consequenc-
es of achieving net zero emissions across the UK (including indirect and supply chain impacts on 
both activity levels and competitiveness) must be understood and addressed if the permission and 
participation of citizens, politicians, businesses and financiers is to be secured and sustained. 
How can enabling and realising net zero actions 
contribute to stimulating the economy?
Moreover, consideration of economic consequences 
cannot be limited to GDP and employment impacts, 
but must encompass the quality of expansion (e.g. 
the labour productivity underpinning GDP expansion 
and real earnings/wage premia associated with 
employment) and the public budget impacts, alongside 
other non-economic variables (such as health) that can 
be expected to at least indirectly impact our economic 
wellbeing (e.g. through NHS spending).
A key element in addressing these challenges is 
the need to identify the nature, timing and potential 
beneficiaries of any sources of net economic gains 
potentially emerging from net zero actions and how 
they are enacted, and to consider how these could 
be used to balance costs accruing to some actors 
in areas of the economy and to public budgets. 
2. Realising stage:
1. Enabling stage:
First, before any emissions reductions can begin, there is a need to invest in, install and facilitate operation of new 
equipment, infrastructure and/or systems capability to enable emissions reduction. This can provide a source of 
wider economic stimulus, depending on the supply chain activity required, but could also ‘crowd out’ activity and 
competitiveness in other areas of the economy, depending on resource constraints and consequent pressure on prices. 
Second, with this capacity and capability in place, the UK can actually realise emissions reductions by drawing on 
this new capacity in how people live and work, with particular attention to how such sustained changes may trigger 
ripple effects that could impact not only the composition of our GDP generation and employment across different 
industries and supply chains, but the quality and competitiveness thereof. 
This is important in terms of the fact that any action 
will involve both costs and benefits.v In this context it 
is also important to recognise that not all net zero 
actions can be expected to independently deliver 
net economic gains in their own right, but could still 
play an important role in sustaining key sectors of 
the economy, particularly those that support high 
value supply chains across the UK economy. This 
perspective is also necessary in order to understand 
and secure different types of returns for those being 
asked to bear near term costs.
In developing a common understanding of how 
decarbonisation actions can deliver economic costs 
as well as benefits, this paper builds upon the initial 
Framework developed by CEP and categorises 
activities into two stages:
In short, there are opportunities that come with 
investing in both enabling and realising net zero 
actions both in terms of our economic recovery, 
but also to smooth the transition back onto the net 
zero path as decarbonisation programmes build 
the economic and fiscal basis to effectively pay for 
themselves in a sustainable way. 
This approach can put money ‘back in the pockets’ 
of those whose incomes, and ability to earn 
incomes, have been impacted by the crisis. It also 
helps sustain the contribution of high value and 
strategically important energy intensive industries as 
we move towards living and working in a net zero 
economy and society. 
Particularly in the current uncertain international 
economic and policy landscape, acting now to 
assure firms of the longer-term benefits of doing 
business in the UK, will also be a crucial element of 
any successful stimulus framework.
Nonetheless, given the depth of the economic 
crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, and the 
need to secure a rapid and resilient recovery of the 
economy and the ability of business and citizens to 
‘make a living’, it is crucial that any net zero actions 
included in a recovery package can perform against 
criteria that any other stimulus action would be 
assessed on. For this reason, it is important to identify 
comparative metrics, such as performance on key 
indicators (e.g. jobs, GDP in different time frames) 
per £1million of stimulatory spending. However, 
this must be set in the context not only of our need 
to prioritise the need for deep emissions reductions 
but also in setting the foundations for what we want 
and need our economy to look like going forward 
through the transition and beyond.
Both of the stages above will involve costs but, 
crucially, can also generate economic gains that 
ripple across the wider economy. In order to do that 
though, it is important to recognise two key points: 
First, activities that create capacity and/or involve 
operating new equipment/systems are economic 
activities and can therefore (e.g. through building 
infrastructure) create economic value even if only on 
a transitory basis. A critical question here is how this is 
paid for, by whom and when. 
Second, once society begins to live and work with 
emissions reducing technologies, this will affect how 
much we can do with the resources we access and pay 
for. For example, replacing heating systems with ones 
that enable people to heat their homes and businesses 
at a lower cost per hour can increase economic 
efficiency as well as carbon efficiencyvi.  On the other 
hand, if people need to use more equipment to do the 
same things as before, but with lower emissions – for 
example if industries need to introduce ‘end of pipe’ 
carbon capture equipment - economic efficiency may 
fall as carbon efficiency increasesvii.  It then becomes 
crucial to consider how the competitiveness of those 
industries can be sustained as they deliver the emissions 
reductions required for a net zero society.
The extent and evolution of any net gains, how they 
are distributed across industries, households and the 
public purse, and how they may balance against 
unavoidable costs, will depend very much on how 
activity at each stage is planned and conducted.vii  
This will include factors such as the extent to which the 
skills, capacity and infrastructure already embedded 
in UK supply chains can be utilised – and/or the 
extent to which domestic content can quickly evolve or 
develop – rather than relying on importing goods and 
services to enable and realise emissions reductions. 
Maximising domestic content, where possible to do 
so, provides a basis for boosting the wider economic 
returns that can be set against the total costs that 
must ultimately be recovered from UK citizens and 
businessesix. It also makes more important the need to 
identify sources of near term net economic gains that 
could be used to offset both upfront capital costs and 
any continued implications for the costs of operating 
in the UK. In circumstances such as those we face 
now, identifying sources of near term economic gains 
from net zero actions can also translate to contributing 
to the wider recovery of the economy following a 
crisis like the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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6In showcasing the potential application of the CEP Net Zero Principles Framework we have drawn 
evidence from three pieces of ongoing research in areas which are already the focus of net zero policy 
planning. These are (with endnote references to the underlying research and methodology):  
accounting matrix that incorporates, where possible, 
industry-by-industry input-output (IxI IO) accounts 
produced as part of national accounts.xiv  
Our UKENVI model is currently calibrated on a 
2010 SAM. While it is currently being updated to 
incorporate newly pubished IxI IO data for 2016, the 
state of the economy in 2010 (following the 2009 
financial crisis) may be a useful benchmark given the 
current Covid-19 contraction. However, this means 
that any £ results reported here must be considered 
in terms of those 2010 prices. 
As outlined in Section 2, the CEP Framework involves 
considering impacts at both enabling and realising 
stages of any net zero action. The three examples 
selected, and the order they are presented in, are 
useful in considering the different ways and context 
that the Framework can be applied, and showcase 
the opportunities that come with investing across a 
range of net zero activities. 
Energy efficiency delivered through ECO constitutes 
an example where both enabling (retrofitting) and 
realising (households enjoying energy efficiency 
gains) are, in practise, both in progress now. This 
allows our simulation work to draw on real data 
to inform both stages, with consideration of how 
any new stimulus element could involve a limited 
adjustment in policy approach. 
In terms of the required EV rollout, electricity network 
operators are currently considering reinforcement 
Simulating the economy-wide impacts of enabling and 
realising activities: the economic benefits of investing in 
domestic energy efficiency, electric vehicles and CCS 
infrastructure
Our approach 
• 1. Residential energy efficiency delivered
through the Energy Company Obligationx
• 2. Reinforcing the electricity network to
facilitate high EV penetrationxi
• 3. Enabling CCS in the UK through investment
in CO
2
 transport and storage infrastructurexii
The evidence is generated from application of our multi-
sector economy-wide CGE simulation model, UKENVI. 
CGE models are already used in policy analysis, 
including by HM Treasury in the UK.xiii  The key benefit 
of the CGE approach in contributing to the policy 
discourse is that it captures wider economy impacts 
triggered by a given disturbance in any one sector 
or area of the economy (e.g. investment spending, 
export demand, resource efficient, tax rates etc.) and 
these transmit through responses to changes in prices, 
incomes, demand and supply in all sectors and markets. 
It is important to note that CGE is a scenario 
simulation framework. It is most commonly used 
for ‘what if’ or ex ante analyses, with results most 
usefully considered in terms of what qualitative 
and quantitative changes in the economy may be 
expected with all other things remaining as they 
were before, rather than somehow projecting or 
forecasting economic development more generally. 
The specification, configuration and assumptions 
depend on the questions being asked and focus of 
the analysis. The core structural database is a social 
and upgrade requirements required to support this 
(via Ofgem’s RIIO-2 Price Control processxv). While 
the rollout has begun, both enabling and realising 
activity are at an earlier stage, but with sufficient 
projected/projectable data to consider the types of 
impacts that may emerge at both stages, how they 
may interact, and where policy attention may be 
directed to improve evolving outcomes. 
Finally, although CCS deployment in the UK is 
at a very early stage, information on the size 
of the CCS Infrastructure Fund and previous 
government-funded research into the characterists 
of different geological CO
2
xvi storage sites, 
is sufficient to begin considering the potential 
nature and magnitude of wider economy impacts 
emerging at this enabling stage. In the future, any 
return generated through actually realising an 
operational CCS industry in the UK (e.g. through 
investment in CO
2
 capture and creating investable 
business models for CCS projects) should ultimately 
aim to offset such upfront investment and generate 
sustained economic and societal value. That is, one 
aim may be for such a ‘CO
2
 Mangement’ industry 
to become part of our transitioning economy.
In the subsequent three sub-sections, we take 
each of the three cases in turn, first examining the 
economic nature of the enabling and realising stages 
of the net zero action, how it is or can be funded, 
and how these factors may be simulated in the 
CGE framework. We then report and analyse the 
modelled outcomes and their relative performance 
as potential post-Covid stimulus package activities, 
before considering the policy implications and 
challenges arising from the type of impacts  on 
economic well-being and distribution of net costs/
benefits that are observed. 
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Supporting household energy efficiency improvements is widely recognised as a source of sustained 
wider economy gains. This is because it enables households to use less energy, thereby reducing 
their required spending on energy bills and increasing real disposable incomes that can be spent 
on other goods and services.xvii  
Enabling and realising residential energy efficiency gains
CEP researchxviii produced in collaboration with the 
BEIS Clean Growth team in 2019/2020 focussed on 
how the sustained wider economic expansion triggerred 
by the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) policy for 
domestic energy efficiency could be sustained and 
potentially justify continued public spending support. 
Whilst ECO only funds a sub-set of energy efficiency 
projects in UK households, with private loans being 
the dominant source of finance, the research brought 
attention to the potential expansionary power of 
different funding mechansims, albeit in the context of the 
scale of the current ECO programme. 
The work showed that retrofitting activity (and the 
installation of new boilers) supported by ECO (what we 
define as the ‘enabling’ stage) in itself has the potential 
to deliver a GDP expansion of up to 0.02% above what 
it would otherwise be, and to support a peak of  just 
under 6,500 full-time equivalent (FTE) in 2023, even if 
no efficiency gains were actually realised. This assumes 
that ECO only runs for the 16 years, from its inception 
in 2013 to 2028, with the implication that these wider 
economic gains are transitory and begin to erode at 
the end of this timeframe. 
However, from the outset, households actually begin 
realising energy efficiency gains that equate to each 
beneficiary household using, on average, 17.2% 
less energy to heat their homes at the current level. 
This releases more disposable income to spend 
on other things, triggering further expansion across 
the economy. It is this realising stage that delivers 
sustained economic expansion driven by shifting and 
increasing consumer expenditure. The research found 
that, by enabling energy efficiency gains across more 
UK households equating to a 2.4% energy saving 
across the entire household sector sector, ECO in its 
present form has the potential to deliver a sustained 
GDP boost of up to 0.07% per annum (see Figure 
1), supporting just over 19,500 full-time equivalent 
(FTE) jobs across a wide range of sectors supporting 
household expenditure in the UK economy. 
The analysis shows that spending approximately £10.9 
billion on ECO between 2013 and 2028 would 
translate to a societal return of 1.8 jobs and £2.3million 
of cumulative GDP gains (by 2040) per £million spent. 
Sustained economic gains are mainly concentrated 
in, and driven by, those sectors where households 
spend their money, while shorter term gains are 
also spread over the construction supply chains that 
deliver retrofitting projects. Despite upward pressure 
on prices in a constrained economy, the simulations 
suggest that the only UK sectors that ultimately suffer 
net losses as a result of this consumer spending driven 
expansion are in the energy supply industries, where 
demand for output falls with efficiency gains, albeit 
with some offsetting stimulatory power as the wider 
economy expands. In the shorter term, price pressures 
from increased demand may crowd out some activity 
in more export-orientated industries.
Moreover, there is potential for even greater 
gains. The centralised nature of the current ECO 
programme means that there is significant rent 
extraction (e.g. through charging of standard per 
project prices where many individual projects can 
in fact be delivered at lower than average costs). 
The implication is that only £4.2billion of the total 
£10.9billion may actually be spent on retrofitting 
activity. The research estimated that if rent extraction 
could be reduced, this would enable efficiency 
gains in a larger number of UK households, 
potentially almost doubling total energy savings 
and emissions reductions, and raising real average 
income and spending gains to power a larger 
sustained expansion. This could ultimately equate 
to the sustained societal return per £million of ECO 
spending reaching 3.4 FTE jobs and £4.4million in 
additional (cumulative) GDP by 2040.
ECO is funded through the energy bills paid by 
all residential consumers (households), and there 
remain critical questions about the validity and 
fairness of this approach of paying for the low/net 
zero transition through a ‘socialisation of costs’xix.   
Therefore, the CEP research also considered other 
approaches to funding the retrofitting activity that 
could enable residential energy efficiency gains 
and the resulting economic stimulus triggered by 
reduced spending on energy bills. Specifically, 
the research focussed attention on the role of 
zero interest loans or grants funded by income 
tax (another but more progressive approach to 
socialising costs) to allow households to design 
and contract their own retrofitting (and/or boiler 
purchase) projects. Such a decentralised system 
would have a lower overall cost, estimated at 
£9.8billion in the timeframe to 2028. 
We found that, on the basis of greater energy 
efficiency gains actually realised and, thus, more 
consumer spending power freed up to drive wider 
economy expansion, either approach would enable 
greater GDP and employment gains over time. See 
Figure 1 for the simulated GDP trajectories under the 
different funding models considered. In the scenario 
simulations, the tax-funded approach is assumed to 
be self-contained in that future revenue gains can 
be redistributed via income tax reductions to further 
power a consumer driven expansion. On this basis, it 
has the potential to deliver the greatest expansionary 
power, but is an approach not currently in practice in 
at UK national level. 
Loans, on the other hand, are already a prevalent 
source of finance for enabling energy efficiency 
increases in the UK household sector. In the 
scenarios, we consider zero interest loans only, which 
ultimately deliver sustained GDP gains of 0.17% 
per annum over what they would otherwise be and 
employment gains that equate to 4.6 FTE jobs per 
£1million of spending. This is more than double the 
estimated long-term employment return for the current 
ECO programme (1.8 jobs per £1million spent), and 
more than could be achieved if there were no rent 
extraction issues (3.4 jobs per £million). 
However, in the nearer term, particularly with 
higher income (and higher spending) households 
facing loan repayments and/or higher tax bills, the 
expansionary power of these alternative funding 
mechanisms is more limited. 
The research also considered the impacts in the first 
years after investment (given the recovery context of 
this paper) if energy efficiency gains do not actually 
transpire. This involved considering the enabling 
stage of retrofitting alone in isolation to assess what 
may happen if efficiency enhancing equipment is not 
used in a way that realises all potential efficiency 
gains, or if real income gains are otherwise offset. 
The latter could transpire, for example, if energy bills 
rise to cover the costs of other net zero actions, such 
as in the EVs case below. We found that under such 
circumstances, either a loan or taxpayer-funded 
approach to supporting residential energy efficiency 
could actually deliver some net negative jobs 
impacts per £1million of spending in some years. 
This would occur as the recovery of costs through 
increased income tax or loan repayments begins 
to build alongside more energy efficiency projects 
completing in a larger number of UK households. 
Ultimately, this could depress the consumer spending 
driver of the wider economy expansion triggered by 
residential efficiency gains.
Key policy implications: Key 
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Figure 1: Comparison of shifting UK GDP trajectories enabled by UK 
-2028 under
different funding schemes
ECO (with economic rent) ECO (no rent present) Fully socialising through income tax
Key policy implications: energy efficiency
In summary, ECO is only relevant 
for a subset of residential energy 
efficiency actions; if other funding 
mechanisms could come into play 
in different timeframes to fund 
more energy efficiency projects, 
the expansionary power of energy 
efficiency policies could be further 
enhanced. Our research identifies  
zero (or even low) interest loans 
as an existing approach that could 
markedly increase GDP and jobs 
‘return’ per £1million.
The results show that the positive 
economy wide impacts of energy 
efficiency investments ultimately 
have real potential to more than 
offset the costs of the current ECO 
programme. This, in turn, means that 
successfully enabled and realised 
residential energy efficiency projects 
within the scale of the current ECO 
programme could shift the UK 
economy onto a trajectory with up 
to 0.25% per annum GDP gains 
(depending on the mix of funding 
mechanisms going forward which 
would need to extend beyond ECO 
to include more loan-finance and/
or government grants). 
Improving the energy efficiency of 
domestic households can provide 
a suite of economic benefits on 
top of the recognised emissions 
reduction and health benefits. From 
the outset, the retrofitting process 
generates GDP accompanied 
by jobs and growing wage 
incomes. Crucially, the interaction 
of enabling and realising energy 
efficiency actions ultimately deliver 
key benefits that allow people to 
reduce household bills, thereby 
raising real incomes and spending 
power that can be directed 
to other goods and services 
produced in the UK economy. This 
could be an important mechanism 
for reducing fuel poverty and 
helping those who may have been 
worst affected by the Covid-19 
slowdown. 
In terms of ensuring a sustained 
economic recovery, where this type 
of net zero action can continue to 
pay for itself – and potentially help 
support other actions – another 
key concern for policy makers 
must be to ensure that any funding 
gaps are bridged in the near term 
and that private sector lenders are 
encouraged to provide zero or low 
interest loans. This is important not 
only in the context of the Covid-19 
pandemic but also in relation to the 
UK exit from the European Union, 
where CEP research funded by 
UKERC has indicated (in a Scottish 
context) that Brexit may also pose 
a significant risk to the availability 
of funding for domestic energy 
efficiency retrofit programmesxx.   
1. 2.
There is a need for careful 
consideration of how alternative 
funding mechansims may impact 
household real incomes and 
spending power in the near term, 
particularly where the impacts of 
the Covid-19 slowdown are still 
being felt. Energy efficiency actions 
funded by loans can ultimately 
provide sustained GDP and 
employment gains per £1million 
spent that are at least double what 
can be achieved via the current 
ECO programme (depending on 
interest rates, where our 4.6 jobs 
per £1million spent applies to zero 
interest loans). However, particularly 
in the near term, anything that 
substantially affects the realisation of 
real income gains and the increased 
consumer spending that powers 
wider economy expansion could 
lead to net negative impacts on 
GDP, employment and other wider 
economy gains in a manner that is 
not observed under ECO. 
3. 4. 5.
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The rollout and uptake of EVs is seen as a key component of achieving deep emissions reduction in 
private transport and facilitating the transition to a net zero economy. The research reported in CEP’s 
paper published in Energy Policy, and a linked policy brief, demonstrates that it too can deliver both 
near and sustained longer term economy-wide gains. 
Enabling the EV rollout through electricity network upgrades
An important finding emerged from this work in that, 
while any increased efficiency in fuel costs per mile 
travelled will have positive wider economy impacts, 
the real driver of sustained gains from shifting to EVs 
is strong UK supply chain activity driven by powering 
vehicles with electricity. Put simply, fuelling vehicles 
using petrol and diesel relies heavily on imported 
supply chain content while the UK electricity industry 
tends to have strong domestic supply chain linkages, 
for example supporting up to as many as three times 
more jobs per £1 spent on fuelling.xxi  
The dual challenge in the current Covid-19 recovery 
context concerns: (a) the speed at which particular 
private households will actually switch to EVs, fuel 
their cars with electricity, and respond to ‘smart 
charging’ capabilityxxii; and, (b) the need to deliver 
large-scale infrastructure upgrades in incremental 
stages to enable significant levels of EV penetration. 
The latter is particularly important in the UK regulatory 
context, where Ofgem’s Price Control mechanism 
constrains investment planning to ensure that 
consumers do not pay (via energy bills) for capacity 
building ahead of demand actually transpiring. 
Indeed, in all of the scenarios examined in CEP’s 
research, the combined impact of cost recovery 
and rising demand for electricity constitutes 
the main constraint on the wider economy 
expansionary power in all timeframes that is 
triggered by enabling potential gains from the shift 
to EVs and electric fuelling.
The existing CEP researchxxiii  focussed on the 
potential economy-wide impacts of both enabling 
(through electricity network upgrades) and realising 
(through EV uptake and operation) stages of a 20% 
penetration of EVs in the private fleet by 2030xxiv.  
This is estimated to require a £2.7billion investment 
by 2030, which does not necessitate any direct 
government spending as all costs are recovered by 
electricity network operators through both business 
and residential consumer bills over the average 45-
year lifetime of assets created. 
Crucially, current conditions dictate that electricity 
network operators are likely to import two-thirds of 
the total investment requirement, with only £0.9billion 
spent within the UK, mainly on construction rather 
than equipment requirements.xxv This equates to 
limited expansionary power from investment 
spending where the full costs are recovered through 
the electricity bills of all system users. 
The net long run impact of investing in electricity 
nework upgrades to support the EV rollout is positive, 
with GDP per annum shifting to a trajectory that, by 
2030, could be 0.1% higher than it would otherwise 
be. It is important to note, however, that the simulations 
suggest a slight contraction in GDP around this time if 
investment activity has to be condensed in the 3 years 
immediately prior to this crucial projected demand/
rollout stage (as currently required under Ofgem’s 
regulatory framework). This is due to the impact of 
price pressures and ‘crowding out’ of domestic and 
export demand components of GDP.
The expansion triggered by the EV uptake that is 
enabled by investment to facilitate the projected 
rollout (which will, in practice, not be limited to 
electricity network upgrades) ultimately supports up 
to 3,000 more FTE jobs across the UK economy. 
This maps to just under 1.2  FTE jobs per £1million 
spent. It compares to the minimum 1.8 FTE jobs per 
£1million in a more constrained ECO case (where, 
as discussed in section 3.2, significant rent extraction 
erodes funds actually directed at enabling efficiency 
gains, with potential refinement of ECO and/or other 
funding approaches providing potential to increase 
the per £1million and total wider economy gains).
In terms of what industries gain and lose, there are 
some similarities with the case of enabling and 
realising energy efficiency in that, while construction 
supply chains enjoy a large share of gains in the 
near term, the ultimate ‘winners’ are likely to be those 
sectors that (directly or indirectly) support consumer 
spending. However, the key difference in the EVs 
case is that the switch to electric fuelling of vehicles 
means that the electricity industry and its strong 
domestic supply chain share substantially in the gains. 
Again, and despite general price pressure from what 
is essentially domestic demand driven expansion, the 
only sectors that ultimately suffer net losses over the 
longer term are those supplying conventional vehicles 
and fuel. These industries are likely to suffer losses 
regardless on the journey to a net zero economy. 
Of course, this then raises another challenge for 
policymakers considering a potential acceleration of 
activity to enable the EV uptake: ensuring that gains 
from switching to EVs can offset losses in these sectors 
and their supply chains (and provide alternative 
employment for workers and capacity) in the near 
term. That is, more generally ensuring a smooth and 
just transition for firms and workers in those sectors 
supporting conventional vehicles and fuelling. 
The source of the more constrained expansion in 
the EVs case (relative to that of energy efficiency) 
is specific to the enabling element considered 
in CEP’s research, and particularly the need to 
recover electricity network investment costs through 
consumer bills. This is reflected in the higher level 
results illustrated in Figure 2. Here, the analysis shows 
that the real expansionary power of enabling the EV 
roll-out lies in the uptake of the vehicles themselves 
and, more specifically, in the shift to fuelling using 
electricity rather than petrol or diesel. It is then the 
timing and timepath of electricity network investment 
that generates some disruption. 
On the one hand, spreading investment over a 
longer timeframe enables a smoother adjustment of 
the wider economy. On the other, earlier investment 
requires an earlier triggering of the process of 
recovering costs through energy bills. Thus, there is 
a trade off. The 3-year case in Figure 2 shows that 
allowing the EV rollout to begin by making more 
use of existing infrastructure – as required under 
the current regulatory environment – may enable 
a transitory decrease in electricity prices (all other 
things remaining equal). This introduces a range of 
transitory price pressures around 2030. Results for 
the 12-year case show that upfront investment would 
resolve the latter problem, but at the cost of putting 
upward pressure on electricity prices from the outset, 
which could be counter-productive in the current 
Covid-19 environnment.xxvi   
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0
2
0
2
1
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
3
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
5
2
0
2
6
2
0
2
7
2
0
2
8
2
0
2
9
2
0
3
0
2
0
3
1
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
3
2
0
3
4
2
0
3
5
2
0
3
6
2
0
3
7
2
0
3
8
2
0
3
9
2
0
4
0
%
 c
h
a
ng
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 u
nc
h
a
ng
in
g
 b
a
se
 li
ne
Year
Figure 2: Impacts on GDP and the price of electricity of 20% EV penetration 
by 2030 and required electricity network investment (alternative scenarios 
with £2.7billion investment spread over 3 years 2027-2029, or 12 years 
2021-2032)
GDP (12-years) GDP (3-years) Price of Electricity (12-years) Price of Electricity (3-years)
In this regard, the findings are consistent with the 
perspective of the current regulatory model, where 
meeting the requirements of demand anticipated in 2030 
cannot be brought forward within the current RIIO-2 
Price Control business planning process. Thus, the 3-year 
timepath in Figure 2 is the more relevant under the current 
regulatory model, but does not offer any potential for the 
electricity network investment to provide any additional 
near term expansionary power on top of what the EV 
rollout itself supports (noting that the expansionary power 
of such investment is is constrained by the need to begin 
recovering the costs of the investment through electricity 
bills from the outset). Of course, this may be less of an 
issue in the context of other activities (e.g. investing in 
public charging infrastructure) to enable the EV rollout, 
where investment activity could introduce net additional 
expansionary potential. The crucial question is how costs 
are recovered, as with the case of retrofitting to support 
energy efficiency, where ECO also involves recovery of 
costs through energy bills. The crucial question is whether 
the cost recovery factor is sufficient to offset any net gains 
that the investment activity itself can support.
Key policy implications: electric vehicles
The rollout of EVs is not only essential to achieving 
net zero emissions and reducing air pollution, but 
can also provide strong opportunities for wider net 
economy gains. Our research has demonstrated 
that there could be up to 3,000 additional FTE jobs 
associated with even the initial stage of enabling the 
UK EV rollout up to 2030. 
It is crucial for policy makers to consider issues 
around the type of investment activity that requires 
recovery of costs via energy bills. In the case 
examined here, the full costs of electricity network 
upgrades have to be recovered from consumers 
(albeit over an extended time period) which 
combines with a significant increase in demand 
for electricity that could drive up energy bills for 
all consumers, and constrain the wider economy 
expansion. 
1. 2. 
Enabling a greater share of investment with UK 
content (we model 1/3rd) could provide greater 
expansionary power to offset costs. However, it is 
unlikely that this could be achieved in the near term 
timeframe that is so important in terms of the Covid-19 
recovery (and where the current regulatory approach 
does not permit significant investment ahead of need 
in any case). On the other hand, public investment 
in other enabling activities (e.g. greater provision of 
public charging infrastructure) could be designed 
to incorporate greater reliance on domestic 
supply chains in the near term and, thus, increase 
expansionary power.
3. 4. 
More generally, where upfront investment in net zero 
infrastructure has implications for real household 
spending power through increased energy bills or 
taxes, this can constrain near term expansionary 
power of the associated net zero action, as well as 
having implications for the public perception and 
reality of whether a ‘just transition’ is being delivered. 
This issue is not specific to the EV context in which 
we raise it. Indeed, the trade-offs involved in 
considering the impacts of large upfront investment 
in reinforcing electricity networks are perhaps even 
more pressing and relevant in the context of 
electrifying heat.
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The third and final example presented here focuses on the potential wider economy impacts of initial 
enabling stage work for carbon capture and storage (CCS) infrastructure, where the UK Government 
has allocated funds from existing budgets, thus removing the need for immediate cost recovery 
via taxation or energy bills. At present, £800million is allocated to developing CO
2
 transport and 
storage capacity under the CCS Infrastructure Fund as a first stage to deploying CCS in the UK. 
The Committee on Climate Change has identified 
CCS as an essential component in delivering the 
deep decarbonisation necessary to achieve mid-
century net zero ambitions.xxvii Economy-wide 
simulation work reported in a recent CEP policy brief 
has demonstrated how this could provide a transitory 
but importantly near term stimulus to the UK economy 
that has positive impacts on GDP, employment and 
household real incomes and spending. 
For the purposes of this analysis, two scenarios have been 
considered using the UKENVI CGE model, both involving 
development of pre-identified potential CO
2
 storage sites. 
The first scenario involves the development of 4 storage 
sites (Hamilton, Captain X, Viking A and Bunter 36) with 
a total estimated cost of £1.75billion.xxviii Whilst it is 
highly unlikely that all four of these storage sites would 
be developed by the first candidate CCS projects in the 
UK, the total investments required, and the characteristics 
of the stores in terms of their capacity and ability to 
service the needs of industrial clusters in line with a 
smooth transition to net zero, are broadly in-line with 
what will be required to enable deep decarbonisation 
across major UK industrial clusters such as Teesside, 
Merseyside, Grangemouth, the Humber region and 
south Wales.  
The second scenario focuses on the development 
of only Captain X and Viking A with a total cost of 
£755million. Again, these two stores were not chosen 
because they would necessarily be the first two stores 
developed in the UK, but because their characteristics 
and costs are indicative of what could be funded 
under the Government’s exisiting commitments under 
the CCS Infrastructure Fund.
In the absence of specific information, but informed 
by previous studies and analysis by the Bellona 
Foundation,xxix it was assumed that around 80% of the 
total investment spending is likely to be made within 
the UK, spread across a range of upfront (first year) 
activities and others spread over a six year period 
from 2021. The upfront spending (23% of total spend) 
involves site surveys, well appraisals, engineering and 
design, and securing licences and permits. The latter 
involves a range of design, procurement and 
fabrication activities (pipelines and transport and 
storage facilities, including repurposing of drilling 
platforms), construction and commissioning activities.   
Public investment to enable Carbon Capture and Storage in the UK
Figure 3 demonstrates that the outcome of investment 
in CCS infrastructure is a transitory stimulus to the 
wider economy. These results emphasise the impacts 
of the larger investment programme, but we note that 
the impacts of the more limited £800million investment 
are roughly half the size of those of the £1.75billion 
programme (so that the per £1million results discussed 
below are broadly similar). Given the much smaller 
stimulus, the GDP per annum gains will naturally be 
small relative to those reported in Figures 1 and 2 for 
the energy efficiency and EVs cases. The key point 
to note is that the GDP impact is positive throughout 
the 6 year investment period, maximised at 0.01% 
(£126.4million) in the first year (2021) where there is 
concentrated up-front spending on key administrative 
and survey activities. The annual GDP boost then 
settles at around 0.005%-0.006% (£70million-
£73million per annum) in the three year period 
between 2022 and 2024, before tailing off.
It is important to exercise caution in considering how 
the end of a relatively large but time limited investment 
could cause a slight contraction in subsequent years 
as resources reallocate. In particular, given that what is 
considered here is a first stage in enabling CCS, such 
a down turn may not occur/be delayed, depending 
on what may be planned for subsequent stages and 
progress in delivering the realising stages of CCS (i.e. 
investable business models and policy for CO
2
 capture 
and the operation of a transport and storage system in 
the context of an emerging CCS industry).
Additional job creation associated with the expansion 
(facilitated by an existing pool of unemployed labour) 
is seen across the 6-year project timeframe, requiring 
an additional 3,850 full-time equivalent (FTE) workers 
in the first year, between 2,250 and 2,670 additional 
FTE jobs in each of the subsequent 4 years, and 1,700 
workers in 2026. Given the relatively limited scale of 
investment spending involved, these figures compare 
favourably with total jobs estimated of 12,000 direct 
and indirect jobs associated with the construction of 
Hinkley point, and around 6,500 jobs projected for a 
single pumped hydro station in Scotland in other CEP 
research.xxx  However, we would note the jobs impacts 
of both these power system developments were 
estimated using simple economic multipliers, which do 
not take any account of the type of price and crowding 
out pressures considered in our CGE simulations here. 
In terms of what areas of the economy are likely 
to benefit, the greatest job gains are observed 
in the sectors that directly service the spending 
outlined above, with the UK construction sector and 
manufacturers of fabricated metals and transport 
equipment enjoying gains sustained throughout the 
project period. Due to price pressures triggered by the 
time-limited investment, the simulation results suggest 
some crowding out of export demands in other 
manufacturing sectors, but not enough to generate job 
losses. Crucially, our results show that the employment 
and wage income gains trigger gains in consumer 
spending by UK households that are proportionately 
greater than the GDP boost illustrated in Figure 3. 
The research has only considered early stage projected 
investment spending in physical infrastructure for CCS 
and, thus, it is useful to consider the policy implications 
in terms of two important questions at this stage. 
First, how does the initial investment activity simulated 
here compare with enabling stage activity in the 
other two cases considered in this paper? It is 
important to emphasise that any subsequent realising 
of emissions reducing activity is not simulated here 
– for example, information is not available on the
operation of the transport and storage capacity
created, or contributed to, via this initial investment.
Second, what lessons can be learned in terms of what
the realising stage of CCS in the UK would have to 
deliver to ‘make the case’ for the sustainability of a 
CCS sector in the UK economy as it moves through the 
net zero transition?
Taking the former first, overall, our results suggest that 
the cumulative employment impact of the £755million 
or £1.75billion investment activity in creating CO
2
 
transport and storage capacity as outlined above is 
the transitory creation (respectively) of an average 
1.6 or 1.5 one additional jobs per year per £1million 
spend (with both spending and job creation limited to 
the 6-year project timeframe). Table 3 shows that this is 
markedly more than the combined (long-run) enabling 
and realising outcome reported for the EVs scenario 
above (1.15 jobs per £1million).
A comparable outcome cannot yet be projected 
for CCS, given the lack of firm planning to date as 
to how industrial scale activity in managing CO
2
 
through CCS services could evolve through further 
enabling and, ultimately, realising stages. While the 
miniumum 1.8 jobs per £1million outcome for energy 
efficiency (for the current ECO programme) is clearly 
a strong benchmark, it must be remembered that this 
is also sustained long-run impact, which reflects both 
enabling activity and the full realisation of emssions 
reductions and expansionary processes triggered by 
initial investment activity. 
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Figure 3: Impacts on GDP from public investment on CCS transport and 
storage infrastructure (comparison of 4 sites and 2 sites scenarios)
T&S investment (4 sites) T&S investment (2 sites)
18 19
In terms of the near term year-on-year jobs impacts 
from enabling activity alone, Table 1 shows that these 
are small for both EVs scenarios examined above, 
and for loan finance of energy efficiency. Even 
retrofitting activity under the current ECO programme 
(which is projected to support a peak of 6,500 UK 
jobs in 2023) does not perform as well as either 
CCS investment in terms of average jobs per year 
for every £1million spent. Indeed, while masked by 
the average figures in the first column of Table 3, our 
research shows that network upgrades to support 
EV roll-out may actually generate negative jobs per 
£1million spent in some periods, as could energy 
efficiency actions funded through taxation or loan 
finance (albeit with these losses ultimately offset by 
realising stage gains). 
Crucially, while with network upgrades and CCS 
investment some negative impacts may be observed 
after the end of the investment programme, loan 
finance could in fact drive negative impacts within the 
duration of the programme and some years beyond 
the end. That is, until the repayment period ends (see 
Figure 4). However, it is important to note that all of 
these results will be sensitive to the question of ‘who 
pays’, with the costs of ECO and electricity network 
upgrades to support EVs both recovered through 
energy bills, while the CCS transport and storage 
capacity investment modelled here is assumed to be 
covered by current government budgets.
The challenge, then, becomes one of using near 
term investment to lay foundations for the realising 
stage of CCS, which may involve a new, potentially 
internationally competititive CCS industry to deliver 
similarly strong returns. In previous work, CEP has 
identified a key comparator – given the similarity 
in capital intensive activity – to be the UK Oil and 
Gas industry and the ‘employment multiplier’ of 9 
or 10 UK-wide jobs per direct industry job that it 
has supported in recent years. Such ambition will 
be important, not least given the challenges of how 
carbon capture costs to industry can be met without 
reducing the competitiveness and sustainability of 
high-value manufacturing in a number of regional 
clusters across the UK economyxxxi. In this regard, 
the crucial outcome of this early investment could 
ultimately be the creation of a new large scale CO
2
 
management industry that could help sustain and 
evolve potential hundreds of thousands of direct and 
indirect jobs currently associated with our emissions 
intensive UK manufacturing and fossil fuel industries.
Table 1: Comparison of FTE jobs per £million spent
Key policy implications: CCS
The nature of spending under the CCS Infrastructure 
Fund is likely to create near-term job and growth 
opportunities. While the initial investment analysed 
here only provides a transitory stimulus, this should be 
expected to extend and evolve at subsequent stages 
of delivering a CCS industry in the UK through greater 
investment under the CCS Infrastructure Fund. This 
could play a key role in delivering a ‘just transition’ for 
workers currently employed in fossil fuel industries. 
1. 
Increasing the CCS Infrastructure Fund to £1.75 
billion can not only enable the development of 
CO2 transport and storage infrastructure for all 
major industrial regions of the UK but can deliver a 
higher level of total transitory economy wide 
benefits compared to the planned investment of 
£0.8billion to support CCS in just one or two 
industrial clusters. 
2. 
Average Enabling Stage 
(only) Impacts Across 
Project Timeframe
EE - ECO (with rent) 0.50 (16 years) 0.61 (Year 2) 1.80
0.07 (16 years) 0.89 (Year 1) 4.60
0.05 (3 years) 0.08 (Year 1) 1.15
0.00 (12 years) 0.01 (Year 1) 1.15
1.60 (6 years) 2.36 (Year 1) To be determined
1.53 (6 years) 2.26 (Year 1) To be determined
EE - Interest-free loans
EVs (3-years)
EVs (12-years)
CO2 T&S – £0.8bn
CO2 T&S – £1.75bn
Enabling Stage Peak 
(Year within specific 
project time frame)
Sustained Enabling and 
Realising Stage Impacts
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The case examples examined in this paper show that a 
combination of policy interventions, regulatory changes 
and government investment could be used to stimulate 
activity and investment in the UK economy. Our findings 
highlight that different net zero actions can contribute 
in complementary ways, for example providing GDP 
expansion, peak job creation and income returns at 
different times throughout the mid-century transition 
timeframe. This can both aid near term economic 
recovery while also putting the UK on a sustainable and 
resilient path to net zero. Thus, net zero actions need to 
be considered in terms of how they can be combined to 
maximise economic benefits in a stimulus context, and not 
be seen as a constraint on economic growth. 
Our analysis shows that the mechanism of funding net zero activity 
has key implications for the shape, extent and equity of resultant 
economic expansion. The research highlights the challenge that, 
as for any stimulus action, enabling/up-front investment actions 
can introduce price pressures and crowd out other activities. In 
the net zero and particularly the energy system context, careful 
attention must be given to how energy prices may be affected by 
the design of net zero actions and the need to recover costs over 
different timeframes. This is crucial, both in terms of potential near 
term impacts on those least able to pay, and on how the consumer 
spending driven element of the resulting stimulus may be affected. 
Consideration of, and finding solutions to, this issue is key in 
ensuring that the full potential of net zero actions - in both aiding our 
near term economic recovery and setting crucial foundations for the 
transition ahead - can be be realised in a manner that is considered 
just and acceptable by the UK population and electorate. CEP’s 
research has also extended to how understanding of economy-
wide impacts and consequences can help build consensus in the 
policy discourse and the policy making process for the transition to 
a net zero economy and society.xxxii
The key economic proposition we outline in each case helps us 
begin to identify and understand the near and the longer-term 
consequences of changing the way people live, earn and spend 
money, and how businesses and industry operate. This may in turn 
rely on further policy interventions and, importantly, consumer and 
private sector buy-in. However the actions we analyse here – as 
just a subset of potential net zero actions that must be analysed – 
not only lay foundations for net zero emissions but could play a key 
role in shaping the wider UK economy in the coming decades. 
If delivered in the right way, net zero actions such as these could 
play a key role in ensuring that the UK delivers a prosperous, 
equitable and world leading economy.
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The recent (June 2020) OECD Economic Outlook estimates a GDP drop for 2020 between 11.5% and 14% depending on the 
progress of the pandemic. The report can be accessed here: http://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/june-2020/ 
There is precedence in the practice of introducing ‘green’ measures in stimulus packages following an economic crisis. A joint 
discussion paper by the European Commission and the International Institute for Labour Studies explores the measures that a 
number of countries introduced following the 2009 economic crisis. The paper is available here: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/documents/publication/wcms_194185.pdf 
See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/net-zero-review-terms-of-reference.
See CEP Policy Brief A Net Zero Principles Framework: Fundamental questions for public policy analysis  https://doi.
org/10.17868/71580
This is an important discussion that is currently missing in published work. For instance, a recent Oxford Smith School working paper 
(https://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/publications/wpapers/workingpaper20-02.pdf) and a McKinsey Quarterly article (https://
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/addressing-climate-change-in-a-post-pandemic-world#) 
discuss the importance of using climate change policies in the post-Covid stimulus packages but there seems to be little consideration 
of the associated costs
See for example Open Access Energy Policy paper available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.028 (which 
also includes a review of the relevant literature). Notable examples include this paper by Thomas and Azevedo: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.12.002  and this led by Rosa Duarte: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.09.101 which uses 
the same methodological approach as the one we employ here.  More recently we produced an extended policy briefing of our 
recent work alongside BEIS Clean Growth team available here: https://doi.org/10.17868/71454 
CEP has published a relevant policy briefing available here: https://doi.org/10.17868/71454. CEP has also provided written 
evidence to the House of Lords: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/55/level-playing-field-and-state-aid/publications/
written-evidence/. Further examples of how ‘end-of-pipe’ technologies can affect the wider economy can be found in this paper led 
by Panida Thepkhun: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.037 and Wei Li: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.11.059
This is something CEP explored in a recent Energy Policy paper available Open Access at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2019.111117 . Also see the policy briefing in collaboration with BEIS: https://doi.org/10.17868/71454  
See the 2018 Energy Policy paper: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.05.011 and a more recent (2020) Energy Policy paper 
(focussing on enabling the EV rollout) on the issue of potential impacts of switching towards industries with stronger domestic 
content: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111117
See CEP policy brief at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/71454/. This work resulting from a collaborative EPSRC Impact 
Accelerator project (linking to EPSRC grant ref. EP/M00760X/1, https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FM00760X%2F1) in 
partnership with the BEIS Clean Growth Team. 
See paper published in the journal Energy Policy, available Open Access at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0301421519307049 and a linked CEP policy brief at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/67741/. This work results from 
a Flexible Fund project conducted within the EPSRC National Centre for Energy Systems Integration (EPSRC grant ref. EP/
P001173/1, https://gow.epsrc.ukri.org/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/P001173/1)
See CEP policy brief at https://doi.org/10.17868/64609. This is part of ongoing work in the project being conducted in 
partnership between the Centre for Energy Policy at the Unviersity of Strathclyde and the Bellona Foundation, with funding from 
the Childrens Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF). See project information at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/70760/, and work 
to date on the wider economy impacts of CCS, focussing on operational carbon capture in industry, at https://strathprints.strath.
ac.uk/72094/.
For example, HMT apply CGE methods to analyse the impacts of fuel duty reductions in a paper published at https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/analysis-of-the-dynamic-effects-of-fuel-duty-reductions. Full model documentation on the 
CGE model used by HMT can be found at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/263652/CGE_model_doc_131204_new.pdf.
For the type of input-output national accounting data used as the structural database of CGE models, see https://www.ons.gov.
uk/economy/nationalaccounts/supplyandusetables/datasets/ukinputoutputanalyticaltablesdetailed. 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/network-price-controls-2021-riio-2/what-riio-2-price-control.
ETI Pale Blue Dot – https://www.eti.co.uk/programmes/carbon-capture-storage/strategic-uk-ccs-storage-appraisal  
A review can be found at this 2013 paper: https://dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.34.4.2. More recent examples can be 
found at this Energy Policy paper: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.028 and this Regional Studies paper: https://doi.
org/10.1080/00343404.2018.1490012. Yushchenko and Patel have conducted a similar analysis for Switzerland: https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.12.028, while we can find a Spanish focus in this study led by Rosa Duarte: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.03.065 
https://doi.org/10.17868/72886
See for example the UKERC report at https://ukerc.ac.uk/publications/funding-a-low-carbon-energy-system/ 
See the UKERC report at https://ukerc.ac.uk/publications/brexit-energy-efficiency-scotland/. 
See paper published in journal Energy Policy, available Open Access at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0301421518303033. This work results from a project funed by the EPSRC Supergen Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Hub (EPSRC grant 
ref. EP/J016454/1, https://gow.epsrc.ukri.org/NGBOViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/J016454/1)
In the context of CEP’s work, ‘smart charging’ is charging off peak demand. This is important to keep in mind as researchers often 
refer to grip-to-vehicle solutions when talking about ‘smart charging’.
CEP is in the process of preparing new papers/reports emerging from a subsequent round of research in this area, which 
extends focus on electricity upgrade requirements to support the fuller EV rollout to 2050. Work has also just begun on another 
EPSRC CESI project considering a wider range of potentially important determinant of outcomes, including limited EV uptake 
in low income households and constraints on manufacturing capability to produce vehicles in line with rollout projections and 
requirements.
The CGE model scenario simulations were informed by UK TIMES energy system analyses of investment requirements and fuel cost 
efficiency gains implied by National Grid’s (2018) Future Energy Scenarios (FES), at http://fes.nationalgrid.com/media/1363/
fes-interactive-version-final.pdf. 
CEP’s research was informed in this regard through discussions with Scottish Power Energy Networks.
Current research at CEP, focussing on investment requirements for the fuller EV rollout to 2050, emphasises this finding.
CCC Net Zero Technical Report – https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-technical-report/ 
Strategic UK CCS Storage Appraisal, specifically storage development plans D10, D12, D13 and D14
See the report titled “A UK Vision for Carbon Capture and Storage” (Orion Innovations for the CCSA and the TUC) available to 
download here: http://www.ccsassociation.org/index.php/download_file/view/750/76/ 
See CEP policy brief at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/71142/.
See analysis of this issue in the CEP policy brief at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/72094/. 
See CEP research paper published in the Journal of European Public Policy paper, available Open Access at: https://doi.org/10.
1080/13501763.2020.1742774 
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